Abstract. In 2007, -Invertible Cycles ( IC) was proposed by Ding et al. This is one of the most efficient trapdoors for encryption/signature schemes, and of the mixed field type for multivariate quadratic publickey cryptosystems. Such schemes fit on the implementation over low cost smart cards or PDAs. In 2008, Fouque et al. proposed an efficient attack against the IC signature scheme by using Gröbner basis algorithms. However, they only explicitly dealt with the odd case, i.e. is odd, but the even case; they only implemented their proposed attack in the odd case. In this paper, we propose an another practical attack against the IC encryption/signature scheme. Our proposed attack does not employ Gröbner basis algorithms, and can be applied to the both even and odd cases. We show the efficiency of the attack by using some experimental results. Furthermore, the attack can be also applied to the IC-scheme. To the best of our knowledge, we for the first time show some experimental results of a practical attack against the IC-scheme for the even case.
Introduction
In 2007, Ding, Wolf and Yang [4] proposed -Invertible Cycles ( IC), which is a trapdoor for public-key encryption/signature schemes, and also proposed IC-, which is a signature scheme as a variation of it. The security of these schemes is based on the hardness of solving simultaneous multivariate quadratic equations (MQ system) over a finite field whose characteristic is two; we call the problem "MQ problem". The problem of deciding whether an MQ system has a solution or not belongs to NP-complete, and quantum polynomial algorithms for solving the MQ problem are still unknown. It has been expected that public-key cryptosystems based on NP-complete problems like the MQ problem will replace the schemes based on the integer factorization or discrete logarithm problems which will be efficiently solved by quantum computers. Moreover, the schemes based on the MQ problem are very practical under limited computational resources, such as smart cards or PDAs. The IC scheme is more efficient than Quartz [3] under the same security level.
In 2007, Dubois, Fouque, Shamir and Stern [8] proposed a practical attack against SFLASH which is called C * − scheme with specific parameters. The ICsignature scheme is similar to SFLASH. In 2008, Fouque, Gilles, Perret and Stern proposed an efficient attack against the IC signature scheme by using Gröbner basis algorithms. However, they only considered the cryptanalysis under some condition; namely, they only considered the case that a secret-key as a pair of two transformations S, T is a pair of linear maps not affine ones. Also, they only explicitly dealt with the odd case, i.e. is odd, but the even case; they only implemented their proposed attack in the odd case.
In this paper, we propose an another practical attack against the IC encryption/signature scheme. Our proposed attack does not employ Gröbner basis algorithms, and can be applied to the both even and odd cases. We show the efficiency of the attack by using some experimental results under the most general condition that a secret-key as a pair of two transformations S, T is a pair of affine ones. To the best of our knowledge, we for the first time show some experimental results of a practical attack against the IC-signature scheme for the even case.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will briefly introduce -Invertible Cycles. In Section 3, 4, we will propose the attack against IC. In Section 5, we will show our experimental results. In Section 6, we will conclude this paper.
-Invertible Cycles
In this section, we will describe about public-key cryptosystems based on the multivariate quadratic equations (Multivariate Quadratic public-key Cryptography: MQPKC), and IC ( -Invertible Cycles) and IC-schemes.
MQPKC
We will briefly review about public-key cryptosystems based on the MQ problem. Matsumoto and Imai [16] proposed the first MQPKC scheme. In the last few decades, there has been enormous amount of work devoted to this area. Most public-key cryptosystems based on the MQ problem use a trapdoor function below. For two vector spaces K n1 and K n2 over a finite field K = F q whose characteristic is 2, we construct a public-key as a map P : K n1 → K n2 . Each scheme has the map F : K n1 → K n2 whose inverse images are efficiently computable. This map, which is constructed by the n 2 quadratic polynomials with n 1 variables, is called "central map." We generate a secret-key as a pair of two bijective affine transformations (S, T ). We call these transformations "secret transformations." Of course, the inverse images of secret transformations is easy to compute if these transformations are known. Finally, the map P = T • F • S is made to public. Since it is believed that solving the MQ problem is intractable, we may assume that it is difficult to compute an inverse image for the public-key if secret transformations are unknown.
For the encryption scheme use, Alice (a sender) sends a ciphertext C = P (m), where m is a plaintext and P is Bob's public-key. Bob (a receiver) obtains m = P −1 (C), where
For the signature scheme use, on the other hand, Alice (a signer) generates a signature σ = P −1 (m), where m is a message and P is Alice's public-key. Bob (a verifier) checks whether m = P (σ) or not.
Many central maps are classed as four basic types below.
-MIA (Matsumoto-Imai Scheme A, C * ) [16] , [18] -HFE (Hidden Field Equations) [21] -UOV (Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar) [20] , [17] -STS (Stepwise Triangular Systems) [15] , [25] Although these schemes are efficient, some of them are broken. So some modifiers have been proposed for enforcing schemes against known attacks. For more information about the modifiers, [24] is very useful for us. Ding et al. [4] recommended three modifiers for IC schemes below.
-Minus [23] -Internal Perturbed Plus [21] , [7] , [6] , [5] -Embedding [4] , similar to Fixing [2] We will describe IC-, which is a variation of IC with the Minus method later.
IC
We will show the central map based on IC scheme [4] . Let ≥ 2 be a divisor 
In addition, in [4] , the concrete values of λ i were proposed due to efficiency of computation of the inverse image:
In the case when is even, the condition that q = 2 (i.e. K = F 2 ), are required for bijectivity of the central map. Then, for A = (A 1 , . . . , A ), the explicit central map of these schemes is given as follows.
We call these scheme odd-IC scheme and even-IC scheme, respectively.
IC-
In [4] , some schemes with modifiers were also proposed due to enforcing an IC scheme. The IC-scheme is the scheme applied the Minus method to the IC scheme. Select an integer r < n, and define a projection map Π : K n → K n−r . This scheme uses not P but ΠP = Π • P as a public-key. This modification prevents attackers from breaking the scheme by using bijectivity of P . Because of filling the requirements for security, r has to be some big integer. So this scheme is used not an encryption but a signature scheme.
Ding et al. [4] recommended a signature scheme based on a 3IC-scheme. But they did not mention about specific construction of the scheme. We will describe the possible concrete construction of this scheme below. This construction is the same as that of SFLASH [1] .
[Secret-key]
1. Generate the bijective affine transformation S :
To be more precise, generate randomly an n-dimensional non-singular matrix S L and an n-dimensional vector S C over K, and set a function
3. Generate a random binary string ∆ (enough long to satisfy security requirements).
Let a secret-key be (S, T, ∆).
[Public-key] Construct a map P = T • F • S, where F is the bilinear map over (L * ) below.
Recall that K n is identified to L . By a projection Π : K n → K n−r , let a publickey be Π • P .
[Signing]
We regard the binary strings with length lg q as the elements over K.
1. By applying a hash function to a message, generate V ∈ K n−r . 2. By applying a hash function to the concatenation between V and ∆, generate W ∈ K r . 3. By concatenating between V and W , generate B ∈ K n . Let a signature be
[Verification]
1. By applying the hash function to the message, generate Y ∈ K n−r . 2. Verify that Y corresponds with the element generated by applying Π • P to the signature.
Attack against IC
In this section, we will give an attack against IC schemes.
Summary of Attack against IC
In this subsection, we will show a brief sketch of our attack against IC. The Table 1 shows an algorithm of breaking both a signature scheme (forging) and an encryption scheme (deciphering) based on odd-IC schemes. The attack will be applied to other IC schemes. The attack against IC consists of 2 steps below.
-Reduction to linear transformation -Forging a signature(resp. Deciphering)
In this attack, we employ a property of the easily invertible central map F , which is taken over a public-key P . The MQ problem is reduced to the linear system problem. Table 1 . The algorithm of an attack against odd-IC scheme
Input: a public-key P , parameters q, n, , a message m (resp. a ciphertext c) Output: the valid signature against m (resp. the plaintext for c)
} satisfying forging equations (11) V ← The element over K n generated by applying hash function to m (resp. c) y ← V − P (−v) xspace ← Space of x satisfying forging equations (11) for y x ← A vector of the xspace satisfying y = PL(x) return x − v
Reduction to Linear Transformation
Some attacks against MQPKC need that S and T are not only the affine but the linear transformations. The reduction attacks in the cases of SFLASH [14] , [13] and HFE [10] were proposed. This process is used for the attack by using a differential against the Minus method. Moreover, this reduction is also useful for our attack against IC schemes. We will see in the next section.
As is well known, a polynomial is called a quadratic form or a homogeneous polynomial if all terms of it have degree 2. As for IC, each coordinate of F is a quadratic form. We will see how to use this property. The aim of this attack is to find
is also the quadratic form, whose coordinate consists of only quadratic (including double) terms of that of P . Here, define the differential [12] by a bilinear function below. This function is useful for cryptanalysis against the schemes based on the MQ problem.
We will describe in detail the way of using the differential for an attack against the Minus method later. By definition of DP , the equation below can be easily shown.
Because the right hand of (6) consists of only linear terms of P , it is efficiently computable from the public-key P under the condition that K = F 2 . Then, we can compute v by solving the linear equations created from (6) . Since (a, P (a))
, the function P L , whose S and T are linear, give information about the public-key P .
Forging Equation
We will adapt the attack against C * scheme[22] to IC scheme. Because of concise representation of index, let µ be the function below for each i ∈ Z. Note that this symbol is different from [4] 's one.
where mod express the least non-negative residue. This residue is called the "least positive residue". The obvious relation below is derived between (
Let y be P (x). Then, T −1 (y) = F (S(x)), where S and T are some bijective affine transformation. By applying (8) to this equation, the simple relation below is found. ∑ 1≤i,j≤n
where
This relation induces linear equations between x and y(= P (x)). We call this relation forging equation.
Here, let us examine the number of linear independent equations, i.e. the rank of the coefficient matrix. In the case of even-IC scheme, almost all y makes full rank system. So we can easily forge signatures based on even-IC schemes by using equations (9) . In the case of odd-IC scheme, On the other hand, unfortunately an linear dependent equation exists because λ 1 = λ 2 = · · · = λ = 0. Thus, (9) gives us only (n − k)-dimensional equations, so we need exhaustive search from k-dimensional space.
Odd Case In this subsection, we will give different relation from (8) . Put  (B 1 , . . . , B ) = F ((A 1 , . . . , A )) = (A 1 A 2 , . . . , A A 1 ) for an odd-IC scheme. Using the technique of computation of inverse images shown in [4] , we can obtain the relation below.
Note that the map A i → A i 2 is bijective since A i is in K, whose characteristic is two. Like the previous subsubsection, for y = P (x), we can find the relation q 1 (y 1 , . . . , y n ) = q 2 (x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ), where the total degree of the polynomial q 1 and q 2 is ( + 1)/2. Now we show an advantage of linearity of S and T . By applying (10) to y = P (x) in this case, more simple relation below is found.
where we define y w = y c1 · · · y c |w| for y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ K n and w = (c 1 , . . . , c |w| ) such that 1 ≤ c i ≤ n. For example, in the case that = 3, the equation below is induced.
Thus the reduction attack in Section 3.2 has the advantage that we can save computational space.
Attack against IC-
We will describe an attack against IC-, which is a Minus variation of IC.
Summary of Attack against IC-
In this section, we will show a brief sketch of our attack against IC-schemes. The Table 2 shows an algorithm of breaking signature schemes based on odd-IC − scheme. The attack against IC-consists of 3 steps below.
-Reduction to linear transformation -Recovering the deleted part by using a differential -Forging a signature
This attack is summarized as follows. First of all, the secret affine transformations S and T are reduced to the linear transformation. Secondly, we recover the part which is deleted by the projection in the time of transforming IC to IC-. Finally, we can apply the attack against IC. The first and third step were already showed at the previous section. In the next subsection, we will explain details of the second step. (21) while true do 
Recovering with Differential
In [11] , IC-schemes were broken. This is an application of the attack against SFLASH [8] , [9] . We will describe in detail this attack. In what follows, we assume that secret transformations are the linear transformation. Note that the reduction attack is not applied to even-IC schemes because K is a prime field F 2 .
We can check For A = (A 1 , . . . , A ) and B = (B 1 , . . . , B ) , we have the specific form of DF below.
So we can see
A differential has various properties. If S is linear, the relation between DF and DP is easily shown as follows.
Thus, DP , which is generated by a public-key P , takes over properties of DF .
The property (16) gives us the useful equation below.
Let BS N ξ be the function which represents left side of (17) . Then, we obtain the simple relation below.
We will see how to compute N ξ by using this relation in the next subsubsection. If once we find N ξ , we can recover the projected part. By the definition of N ξ , we can arrive at the useful property as the following.
Then recovering the deleted part by the projection Π is done as stated below.
Note that P f does not have to correspond with original P because a verifier checks Π(P f ) only.
Compute N ξ on Odd Case We consider a way of computation of N ξ . To find a solution of N ξ , we apply the technique of [8] or [9] . The difference of the attack between [8] and [9] is caused by whether kernel of L ξ is trivial or not. On the context of odd-IC scheme, by the definition that L ξ := M (ξ1+ξ2,...,ξ +ξ1) , we can find a non-trivial kernel, which is ξ 1 = ξ 2 = · · · = ξ . In other words, a solution that the right side of (18) equals 0 exists. This leads us a computation method of N ξ , i.e. solving kernel of the function below.
By the cryptanalysis similar to that of [9] , we expect that N ξ is computable under the condition that r ≤ n − 3.
Compute N ξ on Even Case On the other hand, in the case of even-IC scheme, we can find only a trivial kernel. This is because L ξ = M (ξ1 2 +ξ2,...,ξ +ξ1) = 0 is equivalent to ξ 1 = ξ 2 = · · · = ξ ∈ F 2 . So we apply the technique of [8] . Let c ij be the (i, j)-element of N ξ . Then the equation (18) is equivalent to the relation below for i = 1, . . . , n − r.
We cannot solve directly the equation (22) since DP (n−r+1) , . . . , DP (n) are included in it. However, we expect that, for some i, BS
is in the space generated by only DP (j) (j = 1, . . . , n − r). We can solve this relations for i = 1, 2, 3 and obtain non-trivial N ξ . Applying the [8] 's analysis to this scheme, N ξ can be probably induced under the condition that r is up to (n − 2)/3.
1 Our experimental results implies that this assertion is almost correct.
Experimental Results
In this section, we will show some computational results of attacks against IC and IC-. The computational complexity of our attack will be discussed.
IC Case
The following is a summary of our attack against IC schemes.
1 Reduction to linear transformation 2 Forging a signature (resp. Deciphering) 2-1 Finding forging equations (9), (11) 2-2 Forging a signature (resp. Deciphering) by using the forging equations Note that we start this algorithm directly from step 2 in the case that K = F 2 . Main computation of this algorithm against odd-IC scheme is solving O(n ( +1)/2 )-dimensional linear equations over F q in step2-1. So the asymptotic computational complexity of this algorithm is
Similarly, the complexity against even-IC scheme is O(n 6 lg 2 q). We used the computer whose CPU is 2GHz AMD Opteron 246, memory is 4GB, and hard disk is 160GB. Magma [26] was used as a software for writing the program. The Table 3 ,4 shows experimental results of our attack.
Comparing our attack with [11] , our attack would not be so efficient. This is because our attack is simple and completely analogous of Patarin's attack [22] . Fouque et al. [11] stated that Patarin's attack is not efficient and used a technique of Gröbner basis. However, the results show that Patarin's attack is still practical and polynomial time under the condition that is small. 
IC-Case
We will explain about our attack experiments against IC-schemes. In this section, we classify our algorithm into 5 steps below.
1 Reduction to linear transformation 2 Recovering the deleted part by using a differential 2-1 Finding linear equations using a differential 2-2 Solving the equations and recovering the part deleted by a projection 3 Forging a signature 3-1 Finding forging equations (9), (11) 3-2 Forging a signature by using the forging equations This method does not ensure whether we obtain non-trivial N ξ = S −1 • M ξ • S in step 2-2. So our algorithm checks whether we can find non-trivial forging equations (9) in step 3-1. Computational results show that almost all parameters pass this check.
Once forging equation (9) are found, we can forge a signature by only executing step 3-2, which is an easy task. The computational complexity of this algorithm is the same as that of the IC case above. The main operations of our algorithm are step 2 and step 3-1.
Results of attack experiments against proposed parameter at [4] is shown at the Table 5 . We also show some experimental results against 2IC-schemes under the condition that secret transformations are linear at the Table 6 . 
Conclusion
We proposed a practical attack against the IC schemes. This attack can be applied to the IC-signature scheme under the most general condition that secret transformations are linear. Also, oddIC − schemes (with affine secret transformations) for small are efficiently broken by our proposed attack. Furthermore, we carried out computational experiments of the attack against 3IC-signature scheme with the recommended parameters in [4] and showed that forging a signature is efficiently computable. Here we note that these attacks wold not be applied directly to solving the all MQ problems. Main emphasis of our attack is that, by using a property of the central map F , the MQ problem is reduced to solving the linear equations. We used the property to obtain forging equations, which is linear relations between the domain and the image of a public function P . Also, the differential DF enables us to fill the deleted part by a projection. Fouque et al. [11] stated that Patarin's attack would not be efficient, so they used Gröbner basis algorithms. On the other hand, our experimental results explicitly showed that Patarin's attack is still practical and polynomial time under the condition that is small.
